A method is described to generate collisions for the hash function FFT-Hash that was presented by Claus Schnorr at Crypto '91. A set of colliding messages is given that was obtained by this method.
Introduction
In the Rump Session of Crypto '91 Claus Schnorr presented FFT-Hash. This is a function that hashes messages of arbitrary length into a 128 bit hash value. It consists of two rounds, where every round is the combination of a Fast Fourier Transform over GF(2 16 +1) and a nonlinear recursion. It was claimed that producing a pair of messages that yield the same hashvalue is computationally infeasible. We have written a program that outputs a set of 384 bit messages that all have the same hash value for FFT-Hash. The CPU-time consumed is of the order of a few hours. An optimized version of the program is expected to take only a few minutes on a modern PC. The first collision was produced on October 3rd '91.
Description of FFT-Hash
Padding: The message is padded with a single "1" followed by a suitable number of "0" bits followed by the binary representation of its original length. The padded message can then be seen as the concatenation of a number of 128-bit blocks:
Algorithm for the hash function h: 3 Weaknesses of FFT-Hash 1. The FFT step only affects the components with even index. For odd-indexed components no diffusion takes place. 2. The linearity of the FFT step can be used to impose certain values upon a number of output components. If for certain subsets of no more than 8 components, belonging to either the output or the input, the values are fixed, values for the remaining components can be computed such that equation 1 holds. This computation involves linear algebra alone. 3. The diffusion resulting from the recursion step can be completely eliminated by imposing 0 values to certain components. Suppose (e 0 , . . . , e 15 ) is the 16-tuple that has just undergone a recursion step. Suppose e 5 = e 7 = 0. Suppose also that e 6 was never addressed in the indirect indexing term e e i−3 , hence e i−3 = 6 (mod 16) for all i at the moment they are used. Then the 12 MSB bits of e 6 only appear in the calculation for the new value of e 6 . This can easily be seen because when e 5 = e 7 = 0 a product term e i−1 e i−2 containing e 6 must be zero. Because the 12 MSB bits of e 6 can be altered without affecting the outcome of other components when the recursion is applied, e 6 will be called isolated. This can be applied to any component. Hence isolation of a component in a recursion step requires that the two neighboring components are 0 and that it is not addressed in the term e e i−3 for any i.
The Attack
The attack is based on the fact that it is possible to isolate a component during all four steps of g. The colliding messages consist of 3 blocks: M 0 , M 1 and M 2 . All effort goes into the search for appropriate M 1 and M 2 values. The attack is probabilistic. A subset of messagebits are given random values thereby fixing the remaining bits through a number of imposed relations. Starting from H 1 = g(H 0 M 0 ) we have:
1. Calculation of M 1 . The values are chosen in a way that the second component of M 1 (= e 9 ) has a maximum probability of staying isolated throughout the calculation of g. The figure illustrates the internal relations during the hashing process of the colliding messages. Q indicates the component that is isolated throughout the whole calculation. The first result obtained by this method was a set of 805 colliding messages (in hexadecimal notation) 00a1 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 000c 5b18 9156 XXXd 9e89 67e8 35f8 e2b0 12ec 26c0 570b 06ee ba21 8da5 6ec4 c27e 5d5d e6be
where XXX ranges over 1b5 to 4d9 that all hash to 527d c019 d8cb 1d92 162b f04c cfff 26c6
